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The Special Master in School
Desegregation Cases: The Evolution
of Roles in the Reformation of
Public Institutions Through

Litigation
By

I.

GEOFFREY

F.

ARONOW*

Introduction--Constitutional Legitimacy and the
Evolution of Judicial Forms

Traditional constitutional debate on the proper role of the judiciary has focused in the main on the relationship between judicial and
legislative authority. The invalidation of a statute by the Supreme
Court is the usual judicial action which has to be justified and explained. Such rationalizations lead, in most instances, to a theory of
the proper limits of judicial activity.'
In the last twenty-five years, however, the debate has shifted.
While cases touching on the traditional conflict, statutory invalidation,
have by no means disappeared, the present era of constitutional conflict
has been increasingly dominated by the more complex relationships developing between the courts and other governmental institutions.'
These relationships have grown out of institutional reform litigation,
which has moved the courts' attention away from the invalidity of discrete acts of the legislative or, less frequently, the executive branch, and
towards the restructuring of the bureaucractic institutions which discharge the principal functions of the modem state-police, education,
*

J.D., Yale Law School, 1980. The author wishes to express his gratitude to Profes-

sor Owen M. Fiss of Yale Law School for his comments and encouragement in the writing
of this article.
1. The literature in this field is enormous. Its best examples include A. BICKEL, THE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); Fiss, The
Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Forward The Forms ofJustice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979);
Wechsler, Toward NeutralPrinciolesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
2. Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281

(1976) [hereinafter cited as Chayes]; Note, JudicialIntervention and Organization Theory.Changing BureaucraticBehavior and Policy, 89 YALE L.J. 513 (1980).

[739]

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 7:739

punishment, housing, medical services and welfare.3 The restructuring
of these bureaucratic institutions has changed the task of the courts.
The principal focus now involves the formulation, and policing, of the

remedial portion of constitutional litigation. Formerly a relatively minor "cleaning up" operation flowing directly from the invalidation of
the legislative or executive action, the remedial stage has since become
the centerpiece of a new constitutional dilemma.4
This focus on the remedial aspects of litigation, and the more complex relationships between the judiciary and the rest of the governmental order, raises many of the same basic questions which were raised by
the earlier eras of judicial activism. The debate over the scope and
limits of the judicial role in our constitutional system has returned to an
examination of the competence of the judiciary to deal with non-traditional litigation.5 This new period of judicial activism, however, does
present new challenges to the traditional understanding of judicial legitimacy, because it has resulted in the modification of the adjudicatory
paradigm, in the use of nonjudicial personnel like monitors, review
boards, magistrates and special masters in an auxiliary "judicial" capacity.6 The question is whether this modification of the traditional
3. See the following cases dealing with these institutions. Police: Lankford v. Gelston,
364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966). Schools: Hart v. Community School Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699,
supplemented,383 F. Supp. 769 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), afid,512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975). Housing:
Gautreaux v. Romney, 363 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Ill. 1973), rev'd andremandedsub nom. Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 503 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1974), affd sub nom. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976). Mental hospitals: Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D.
Ala. 1972), affdinpart andrev'd inpart sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir.
1974). Welfare: Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd sub nom.
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). Protracted litigation concerning the state prison
system of Arkansas: Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Ark. 1965); Jackson v.
Bishop, 268 F. Supp. 804 (E.D. Ark. 1967), vacated,404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968); Courtney
v. Bishop, 409 F.2d 1185 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 915 (1969); Holt v. Sarver,
300 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Ark. 1969); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), affid,
442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971); Holt v. Hutto, 363 F. Supp. 194 (E.D. Ark. 1973), affdinpart
and rev'd in part sub nom. Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194 (8th Cir.
1974); Finney v. Hutto, 410 F. Supp. 251 (E.D. Ark 1976), a1 7'd,548 F.2d 740 (8th Cir. 1977),
afd, 439 U.S. 1122 (1978).
4. 0. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION (1978) [hereinafter cited as 0. Fiss]; M.
HARRIS & D. SPILLER, AFTER DECISION (1976); Fishman, The Limits of Remedial Power.
Hart v. Community School Board21, in LIMiTs OF JUSTICE 115 (H. Kalodner & J. Fishman
eds. 1978).
5. D. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977); Fuller, The Forms and
Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978).
6. For instance, a board of monitors was established in the case involving the Teamster Union's convention discussed in Note, Monitors: A New Equitable Remedy?, 70 YALE
L.J. 103 (1960). The many uses of magistrates under federal statutory provisions are discussed in Note, Article III Constraintsandthe Expanding Civil JurisdictionofFederalMagis-
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adjudicatory paradigm undermines judicial legitimacy. The charge
that it does is most often grounded on discussions of separation of powers, some expanded notion of due process, or sometimes under the limitations imposed by article III of the United States Constitution. But
these formulas simply cloud the real reason for unhappiness with the
new judicial role: if the courts are forced by this new conception of
judicial activism to abandon the forms which lend legitimacy and efficacy to their participation in government and which defines the proper
bounds of judicial activity, then their assumption of tasks which force
reforms must be, in some fundamental sense, improper.7
Such a challenge to the judicial legacy of Brown v. Boardof Education8 and the remedial revolution that it triggered is, however, narrowly focused and fundamentally mistaken. The formal modifications
of traditional judicial activity do not undermine the judicial role;

rather, they represent a reformation of the adjudicatory paradigm
proper to the demands of the new tasks facing the judiciary in modem
society. I hope to illustrate the propriety of this reformation by focus-

ing on one particular form of this questionable judicial activity, one
which has emerged in the litigation deriving its impetus from Brownthe use of special masters in school desegregation cases.
In the last ten years, the federal courts have begun to appoint spe-

cial masters in many school desegregation cases, principally to aid in
the formulation of remedial decrees. 9 At first glance, these special mastrates: 4 Dissenting View, 88 YALE L.J. 1023 (1979), which argues in favor of limitations on
the role of magistrates in adjudication.
7. See note 5 supra. But see Chayes, supra note 2, for a description of this new phenomenon which at least suggests possible instrumental justifications.
8. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
9. As discussed more fully in the text accompanying note 17 infra, a special master was
appointed in the Cleveland school desegregation case at the time of the finding of liability,
"to assist [the court] in the prudent exercise of its equitable jurisdiction to remedy the constitutional violations. . .[and] so that input may be received from legitimately affected interest groups." Reed v. Rhodes, 422 F. Supp. 708, 797 (N.D. Ohio 1976), remanded, 559 F.2d
1220 (6th Cir. 1977), on remand, 455 F. Supp. 546, supplemented, 455 F. Supp. 569 (N.D.
Ohio 1978) (remedial order).
In the Boston desegregation case, the district court did not decide to appoint a panel of
special masters until well after its initial finding of liability, at the point when the parties had
submitted their own remedial plans. Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410 (D. Mass.
1974), a'dsubnam. Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 580 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied,421 U.S.
963 (1975). The court then appointed the masters "because of the complexity and multiplicity of the school desegregation plans and proposals filed ... " Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F.
Supp. 216, 227 (D. Mass. 1975), supplementing 388 F. Supp. 581 (D. Mass. 1975), at'd,530
F.2d 401 (1st Cir. 1976), supplemented, 409 F. Supp. 1141 (D. Mass. 1975), affldsub nom.
Morgan v. McDonough, 540 F.2d 527 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1042 (1977).
In New York, Judge Weinstein appointed Curtis Burger as special master to "bridge the
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ters appear to undermine precisely those traditional elements of the liti-

gation paradigm which give the courts their legitimacy in a democratic
society-elements intimately tied to our concept of justice based on a
strictly controlled adversarial process. 10 Yet these initial reactions to
the role played by special masters-and, I would contend, those same

reactions to the many other similar techniques and devices developed
by the courts over the last twenty-five years to contend with institutional reform litigation-originates in a misconception of their function
in the adjudicatory process, rather than in well-founded fears of usur-

pation of powers constitutionally delegated to other branches of govemnment.
In this article, I will evaluate the special master as part of a model
which considers them not as "sub-judges," as they are traditionally
thought to be," but as a fusion of elements of the traditional functions
of party and judge. This adaptation, I will argue, came in response to
the demands of a new type of litigation, litigation which (1) focuses in

its liability stage on the unjust results of bureaucratic decision-making
and implementation, and (2) therefore compels a remedial order restructuring those bureaucratic processes. So viewed, the function ful-

filled by' the special master will not only appear proper, but will be
understandable as a necessary response by the judicial system in order
to deal effectively and fairly with this new kind of litigation, while pregap between the court as impartial arbiter of plans placed before it and advocates protecting
their clients' positions that are often narrower than that of society at large" in the formulation of a plan to desegregate Mark Twain Junior High School in Coney Island, Brooklyn.
Hart v. Community School Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699, 764 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 512 F.2d 37
(2d Cir. 1975).
Similar actors have been used effectively in other cases. In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 306 F. Supp. 1291, 1313 supplemented, 311 F. Supp. 265 (W.D.N.C.
1969), vacated on othergrounds, 431 F.2d 138 (4th Cir. 1969), on remand, 318 F. Supp. 786
(W.D.N.C. 1970), a'd, 402 U.S. 1 (1971), the district court appointed a "consultant" to
formulate remedial plans for the desegregation of the school system, and the court ultimately adopted most of the "consultant's" recommendations. In Bradley v. Milliken, 345 F.
Supp. 914, 916-17 (E.D. Mich. 1972), affidinpart,484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'don other
grounds, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), on remand, 402 F. Supp. 1096 (E.D. Mich. 1975), ajf'd and
remanded, 540 F.2d 229 (6th Cir. 1976), on remand, 411 F. Supp. 943 (E.D. Mich. 1975),
aff'd, 433 U.S. 267 (1977), the district court appointed a panel to come up with an appropriate remedial plan for the desegregation of the Detroit schools, although in that instance all
members of the panel had some association with the state or municipal defendants or with
the plaintiffs.
10. For a discussion of some of the constitutional questions posed by the use of
"parajudges" in the federal courts, see Note, Mastersand Magistratesin the FederalCourts,
88 HARV. L. REv.779 (1975).
11. Kaufman, Masters in the Federal Courts: Rule 53, 58 COLUM. L. REv.452 (1958)
[hereinafter cited as Kaufman]; Bryant, The Office ofMaster in Chancery-Developmentand
Use in Illinois, 49 N.W.U. L. REv. 458 (1954).
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serving the definitional qualities necessary to the judiciary's legitimacy
and efficacy in our constitutional system. This approach to the constitutional problem suggests that the techniques developed by the courts
to deal with the novel problems presented by these cases do not undermine judicial legitimacy but enhance it. The new techniques allow the
courts to provide redress for constitutional wrongs which might not
otherwise be remedied, while preserving the underlying structural elements which are essential to the preservation of the court's legitimacy
in the constitutional scheme.

II. The Role of Special Masters: A Description
A.

Masters and Special Masters

Traditionally, the courts have relied on special masters to relieve
congested court calendars. These masters essentially serve as "subjudges" in complex cases. Because of the potential for subversion of
procedural rights inherent in the function of these special masters, their
use in federal courts is strictly delineated by Rule 53 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Under that rule, the special master mimics
the neutral role of the traditional judge. He holds hearings, at which
parties present evidence, as in a trial. The hearing is structured and
2
governed by most of the rules which govern the courts themselves.'
Moreover, the report of the special master in non-jury cases must be
accepted by the court as a final ruling on the issue in question, unless
the findings are "clearly erroneous." The traditional adjudicatory
model, therefore, is duplicated even to the point of limiting the original
of "clearly erroneous"-an apcourt's power of review to the standard
3
pellate court's standard of review.'
The federal district courts, however, have come to use masters in
desegregation suits in a much different manner. Although the uses and
functions of special masters have varied a great deal in each lawsuit,
depending on the particular circumstances of the case and the personalities of the individuals involved, certain general attributes can be detected which clearly distinguish these masters from traditional masters
and from judges.
The special masters in desegregation cases take an active, aggressive, often advocatory role in the proceedings. They are usually aggres12. In many cases, in fact, the people appointed as masters under Rule 53 have been
former judges.
13. See Kaufman, supra note 11; J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, § 1484 (4th ed.
1907).
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sive in seeking out evidence, in questioning witnesses, in going beyond
the information and issues developed by the parties, and in expanding
the scope of their task as they see fit. In fact some special masters appear to believe that their jobs include the formulation of plans for the
complete social reconstruction of the community. 4 In fashioning a
plan for desegregation they have considered a broad range of issues,
such as school financial management, teaching techniques, tracking
policies, transportation and police protection. They have exercised
broad powers of investigation, have interviewed widely in the local
communities, have had the aid of the courts in obtaining detailed data
and analysis from the defendant institutions, and have recommended
final remedial orders which have seldom precisely coincided with the
5
wishes of either the plaintiffs or the defendants.1
The courts, while hardly treating the reports of these special masters as an appellate court would treat the findings of a lower court, have
generally shown great deference to the work of these special masters.
They have almost always given them strong support when their methods were challenged by the parties. The same deference and support
has not always extended to their recommendations. But the courts still
give great weight to the recommendations of the special master, greater
than that given to the proposals of either the plaintiffs or the defendants. 16

One of the cases in which the courts have introduced a special
master into the proceedings to help formulate the remedial decree is the
Cleveland school desegregation case of Reed v. Rhodes. 7 The activities
of the special master in that case represent well the scope of the concerns which these masters have considered and the methods of opera14. See, e.g., the final report of the special master, Curtis Burger, filed in Hart v. Community School Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699 (E.D.N.Y. 1974). See also Berger, Away From the
Court House and into the Field- The Odessey of a Special Master, 78 COLuM. L. REV. 707
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Berger].
15. See note 14 supra. See also various unpublished materials from Reed v. Rhodes,
including the Recommendations of the Special Master Regarding Defendant's Proposed Desegregation Plans, and the various Orders and Opinions attached thereto (undated); Report
of the Special Master Responding to Defendant's Motion to Modify Court's Order of April
1, 1977 (undated); Interim Report by the Special Master (Jan. 13, 1978); Special Master's
Report and Request for Supplemental Orders Regarding School Closings (Dec. 21, 1977);
Summary of Special Master's Hearing of July 15, 1977, prepared for Study Group on Racial
Isolation in Public Schools, Greater Cleveland Project; and materials in Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216 (D. Mass. 1975), including the Order on Motion for Relief Concerning
Security (Dec. 17, 1974).
16. Id.
17. 422 F. Supp. 708 (N.D. Ohio 1976), remanded, 559 F. 2d 1220 (6th Cir. 1977). See
also Reed v. Rhodes 455 F. Supp. 546, supplemented, 455 F. Supp. 569 (N.D. Ohio 1978).
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tion used by the courts and the masters. In the course of his work, the
special master in Cleveland, Daniel R. McCarthy, evaluated the Cleveland school system's financial problems, management techniques, special schools program, contracting system and transportation capability.
The judge, Frank Battisti, repeatedly asked the special master to investigate and report on new problems as they arose, and the judge was
unswerving in his support of the special master. Mr. McCarthy proceeded by use of legislative-type hearings, assisted by two "experts" or
"assistant special masters" and by his own broad investigatory work in
the field. His final recommendations included proposals for restructuring the districts and tracking system in the Cleveland schools, as well as
the most detailed discussion of the form and substance of the figures
that were to appear in reports to be filed with the courts by the defend8
ants. 1
In some respects the use of the special master in the Cleveland case
was not as innovative and ground-breaking as it might have been. But
in one important way Judge Battisti has broken new ground, with the
appointment of a court auxiliary who is a conceptual and functional
cousin of the special master. He did this by ordering the Cleveland
Board of Education to establish a Department of Desegregation Imple-mentation. And the court itself, by court order, appointed the head of
this new department, a Deputy Superintendent of Desegregation Implementation. Although this person is an official of the school system,
the judge defines his job and responsibilities, determines the organizational make-up of his department, and demands periodic reports from
him. Indeed, the order of the court went into some detail in defining
the tasks of this new deputy superintendent, placing him in charge of
overseeing all aspects of the implementation of the court's remedial order and empowering him to recommend changes in the implementation
procedure to the court.' 9
18. See note 15 supra; Memorandum Opinion and Order (Dec. 21, 1977) (planning for
bus transportation); Memorandum Opinion and Order (Dec. 21, 1977) (adopting Special
Master's Recommendations on School Closings). See also Report on Open Court Session of
April 1, 1977 (April 30, 1977), and Text of Judge Battisti's Statement and Orders Issued on
October 19, 1977 (Oct, 19, 1977), both prepared for Study Group on Racial Isolation in the
Public Schools, Greater Cleveland Project.
19. Memorandum Opinion and Order, filed December 21, 1977, in Reed v. Rhodes, 422
F. Supp. 708 (N.D. Ohio 1976). The subsequent history of both the Cleveland school case
and the court-appointed deputy superintendent has been rocky and has produced mixed
results. The court first appointed Dr. Charles Leftwich to the position. He experienced a
rather controversial tenure, during which, at one point, Judge Battisti ordered that four of
the major departments of the school system's administrative apparatus be placed under Dr.
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Federal Executive Auxiliaries

An examination of the role played by two executive departments-the Departments of Justice and Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW)-as auxiliaries to the courts in school desegregation cases
in the 1960s will illuminate the role later played by the special masters.
Starting in the early 1960s, the Departments of Justice and HEW
began to take an active interest in desegregation policy. The courts
tapped these departments' growing expertise and resources in this area.
For example, they brought the Department of Justice into the litigation
as a party-plaintiff, to help develop the proper approach to the individual case. HEW, although not directly involved in the suits, did establish desegregation guidelines, under the command of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964, for school districts wishing to qualify for federal funds.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in which most of the school cases
were at that time being litigated, seized upon these guidelines, which
initially called for "freedom of choice" in the assignment of students, as
the minimum remedy acceptable under the Constitution. In taking this
approach, the Fifth Circuit called openly for a coordinated effort of the
20
judicial, legislative and executive branches to eradicate segregation.
Leftwich's control. Subsequently, Dr. Leftwich resigned and was replaced by Dr. Margaret
Fleming. See note 64 infra.
20. United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ. 372 F.2d 836, 847-61 (5th Cir. 1966),
involved the appeal of a series of desegregation orders from Louisiana and Alabama. The
Fifth Circuit engaged in an extensive discussion of the parameters of the constitutional requirement of desegregation, and the court embraced the HEW guidelines wholeheartedly,
saying they offered, "for the first time, the prospect that the transition from a de jure segregated dual system to a unitary integrated system may be carried out effectively, promptly,
and in an orderly manner." Id. at 852. The court told its district courts that, "[in evaluating
desegregation plans, district courts should make few exceptions to the [HEW] Guidelines
and should carefully tailor those so as not to defeat the policies of HEW or the holding of
this Court." Id. at 848.
The interaction of the federal courts, particularly those of the Fifth Circuit, and the
federal executive branch in the battle to end segregation in public education did not take the
form exclusively of incorporating HEW guidelines into the Constitution. One instance of the
varied forms the interaction took involved the confrontation between the Fifth Circuit and
Ross Barnett (Governor of Mississippi) over the attempts by James Meredith (a black) to
enter the University of Mississippi. The stalemate between the two was broken only after
President Kennedy sent federal troops into Oxford, Mississippi to enforce Meredith's admission. See United States v. Barnett, 330 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1963) (recounting the ju-dicial and
extra-judicial events). Another infamous instance of early maneuvers involving the federal
judiciary, the state executive, and, ultimately, the federal executive, occurred in the effort to
desegregate the public schools of Little Rock, Arkansas. See Faubus v. United States, 254
F.2d 797 (8th Cir. 1958).
For further exploration of the use by the federal judiciary of the path laid down by
HEW, see Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ. 267 F. Supp. 458 (M.D. Ala. 1967), afdsub
nom. Wallace v. United States, 389 U.S. 215 (1967); Dunn, Title 1 I The Guidelines and
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But beginning in 1969 with Alexander v. Holmes County Board of
Education,2 1 a case concerning desegregation in Mississippi, the Departments of Justice and HEW began to display less enthusiasm for
desegregation. Instead of aiding the courts in the formulation of remedial decrees, the executive departments began to urge delay. Only in
the most recent school cases-such as Reed v. Rhodes-has the Department of Justice begun again to play a role in the litigation, usually as
amicus curiae rather than as a party-plaintiff, and on a much more limited scale than in the middle 1960s.22
III.

The Emergence of the Special Master: Conditions
Making the Emergence Possible

The new set of participants-first the executive departments, then
the special masters, and finally, the court auxiliaries used in the implementation process-appeared to fill a gap left in the traditional structure of litigation, a gap caused by the new tasks demanded by
institutional reform litigation: the examination and restructuring of the
multifarious bureaucratic decision-making processes.
One must first look to the functions fulfilled by each of the actors
in the traditional structure of the adjudicatory process, particularly the
role played by the parties. Since the early development of our legal
traditions, an individual, the plaintiff, has been responsible for triggering the adjudicatory process by accusing another individual, the defendant, of a violation of law or custom. The plaintiff not only
introduces the initial issue to be tried, but takes primary responsibility,
through the nature of the accusations, for determining the scope of the
issues to be considered at the trial. The defendant, to a lesser extent,
can expand the considerations at trial, by introducing those matters
pertinent to his defense. The defendant, however, must confine the
matters he introduces to those bearing some direct relationship to the
School Desegregationin the South, 53 VA. L. REV. 42 (1967); Note, The Courts, HEW, and
Southern School Desegregation, 77 YALE L.J. 321 (1967). See also Carr v. Montgomery
County Bd. of Educ., 232 F. Supp. 705 (M.D. Ala. 1964); Carr v. Mongomery County Bd. of
Educ., 253 F. Supp. 306 (M.D. Ala. 1966); Carr v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 289 F.
Supp. 647 (M.D. Ala. 1968), mod/fed, 400 F. 2d 1 (5th Cir. 1968), rev'd andremanded,395
U.S. 225 (1969), reprintedin0. Fiss, supra note 4, ch. 3 (1978). For a concise history of the
litigation of this period, see G. ORFIELD, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTHERN EDUCATION: THE SCHOOLS AND THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT, 15-332 (1969).

21. United States v. Hinds County School Bd., 417 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1969), vacatedsub
nom. Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969), orderamended,United
States v. Hinds County School Bds., 423 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1969).
22. Remarks of Drew Days III, Ass't Attorney General in charge of the Civil Rights
Division, Department of Justice, at Yale Law School (Mar. 1, 1978).
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plaintiffs charges. The court itself takes the most passive role. The
judge is basically a traffic cop. He rules on procedural questions, but
usually only at the instigation of the parties. He keeps order, and expedites the process. He does play a substantive role to the extent that he
the interpreter of the law and, in non-jury cases, as the trier of
acts as
23
fact.
The parties, therefore, are the central agents in the litigation process. They perform five functions: (1) they raise the issues; (2) they
present alternative theories or interpretations of the facts and also, by
not raising such theories, confine the universe of considerations; (3)
they refute evidence and arguments presented; (4) they interpret law
for the court; and (5) they request the form of relief, including all the
alternatives and the justification for those alternatives.
In traditional types of litigation, this reliance on individual parties
to manage a suit from beginning to end seemed well placed. The belief
that the injured person was in the best position not only to raise a complaint but to determine the scope of the inquiry and to develop the
evidence was based on: (1) a non-interventionist concept of the judicial
apparatus, which relied on the assumption that the "invisible hand"
kept the social institutions running smoothly;2 4 (2) a desire for accuracy
and a belief that the injured party was in the best position to advance,
limit and shape the litigation; and (3) a belief that the injured party
should, as a matter of justice, hold the responsibility for the success or
failure of his or her case. Therefore, within the bounds of the rules,
rules essentially designed to assure fairness, the parties were free to develop the evidence of guilt or innocence as they saw fit. The court only
participated actively at the conclusion, to enter judgment.
The courts have been less passive in the remedial stage of litigation. Perhaps this stemmed from their perception that there is less need
for an artificial barrier at this stage to assure judicial restraint. Remedies are more naturally confined by the determination of liability.
There might be some leeway for the court, such as compensation, restoration of the status quo, or the award of some punitive remedy, and
considerations of remedy might also shape the court's approach to lia23. See Chayes, supra note 2.
24. Under this concept, dysfunction, calling for judicial intervention by definition,
would manifest itself by the injury of a particular member or members of the community
who would thereby be moved to call upon the legal apparatus for restitution or retribution.
The idea of the "activist" versus the "non-interventionist" theory of political society, and the
resulting orientations of the legal culture, has been developed most thoroughly by Professor
Bruce Ackerman of the Yale Law School. For an example of a discussion of the concept, see
Ackerman, Four Questionsfor Legal Theory, NoMos XXII, PROPERTY.
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bility at times. But the outcome is sufficiently confined at the time of
remedy by what has come before, in the liability state, to obviate the
concern about judicial overreaching. As a result, the courts have not
been bound by the specific requests for relief advocated by the plaintiffs, but have formulated relief as they deemed appropriate from the
facts of the case. It is in the remedial stage, therefore, that the courts
traditionally have shown the most inventiveness.
Yet a number of factors mitigated against the success of this traditional approach in school desegregation cases and in litigation concerned with the operation of prisons,2" mental institutions26 and
hospitals.27 The most important factor instigating a change in approach was the bureaucratic nature of the violation. This feature of the
litigation led to three major breakdowns in the traditional structure of
the law suit: (1) the default of the directly affected party and the entrance into that vacuum of the organizational plaintiff, (2) the recognition of the breadth of interests affected in the remedial restructuring of
public institutions; and (3) the lack of standards for evaluating a successful remedy. While these factors are obviously interrelated and
therefore likely to create artificial categories, they are extremely useful
in comprehending the dynamics that led to the emergence of the new
structure of constitutional litigation in the United States.
A.

The Bureaucratic Nature of the Violation

What is at issue in school desegregation cases is not a single injury,
nor a series of acts causing harm, nor even (at least in northern school
districts) an explicit official policy found to be constitutionally deficient. Rather, it is a bureaucratic process, a systemic operation of social
25. Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), ardinpart andrev'd in partsub
nom. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977).
26. Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aft'd inpart and re'din part
sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). See Note, Implementation
Problems in InstitutionalReform Litigation, 91 HARV. L. REV. 428 (1977); Note, The Wyatt
Case: Implementation of a JudicialDecree OrderingInstitutionalChange, 84 YALE L.J. 1338
(1975).
27. See generally M. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, AFTER DECISIONS: IMPLEMENTATION OF
JUDICIAL DECREES IN CORRECTIONAL SETrINGS (1976); Note, Monitors: A New Equitable
Remedy?, 70 YALE L.J. 103 (1960). For an excellent discussion of the problems with the
traditional adjudicatory model in deciding issues of public policy and the reformation of
public policy institutions, with some suggestions of appropriate alternative approaches, see
Boyer, Alternatives to 4dministrative Trial-Type Hearingsfor Resolving Complex Scientific,
Economic, andSociallssues,71 MICH L. REv.I11 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Boyer]; for a
discussion of the successes and failures of another extra-judicial device used to monitor and
implement an institutional injunction, see Altman, Implementing A CivilRights Injunction: A
Case Study of NAACP v. Brennan, 78 COLUM. L. REV.739 (1978).
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institutions whose outcome affects all people, albeit in a discriminatory
manner.2" While the injury of discrimination remains easily identifiable, the culpability of those responsible and the means of remedying
the discrimination which results from their acts are obscured by the
processes of bureaucratic decision-making and action.
It is this peculiar focus of school desegregation cases-on a bureaucratic process-which demands more active and continuous participation by both the traditional plaintiff and the court to achieve a
satisfactory solution. By the very nature of bureaucracies, it is a complex task to identify all those responsible within the organization for
acts of discrimination. Responsibility is diffused and bureaucratic action is a cumulative result of many separate decisions and acts; often
those apparently responsible for certain results have no power to alter
their actions, and often actors who at first impression appear to have
nothing to do with the discriminatory result contribute significantly to
the outcome. These institutions are also subject to a variety of societal
pressures and the influence of many political, economic, community
and professional interests.
The nature of the discriminatory violation by a social institution
raises two fundamental problems for the traditional litigation paradigm. First, while the judicial evaluation of liability may focus on the
discriminatory impact of bureaucratic actions on individuals or identifiable groups, the formulation of a remedy has to take into account the
effects on a much larger segment of the populace, since governmental
bureaucratic activities touch either directly or indirectly all lives in the
community. 29 Second, because the bureaucratic process is the product
of so many separate parts, it has frequently been difficult to pinpoint
who is to blame. The job of the court in these cases is made even more
difficult by the necessity of accomplishing two tasks through the injunctive order. The order must not only correct the discrimination, but
must also force changes in bureaucratic decision-making and actions to
insure that the future administration of the school system is not discriminatory.
The courts can sidestep these potential difficulties in the liability
stage of litigation by taking a result-oriented approach. Without attempting to understand the complex elements of bureaucratic procedures, the court can simply look to see if the process resulted in a
segregated school system. The Supreme Court's interpretation of con28. See generally Note, PartiesPlaintiffin Civil Rights Litigation, 68 COLUM. L. REv.
893 (1968).
29. Id.
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stitutional doctrine, however, particularly in more recent years, has required that the courts establish more than defacto segregation before
finding liability."0 This has meant that as the desegregation cases came
to focus more on northern cities, where the causes of the segregation
were less obvious, the courts could no longer avoid in-depth scrutiny of
bureaucratic procedures in order to accurately assign responsibility for
the segregative result.
Perhaps the greatest difficulty with a result-oriented approach to
desegregation cases arises in the consideration of remedies. One can
imagine that the courts could articulate a set of integration goals and
then leave the defendants to implement the goals in whatever manner
they chose. But a number of problems work to preclude such an approach. Historically, the intransigency of the southern states to desegregation suggests that orders allowing defendants discretion would
meet with obstruction and delay. Even an order backed by the threat
of contempt of court would be ineffective. Indeed, such a threat might
backfire, providing instead a rallying point for resistance. In the northern cases, the complexity of the issues would make contempt proceedings appear oppressive at best, assuming any sort of good faith showing
by the bureaucrats-a threshold burden easily met, given the opaqueness of the bureaucratic processes. In the face of pressures from many
diverse constituencies and interests, moreover, it is unlikely that even
public institutions headed by cooperative administrators will reform
themselves without the outside coercive force of the court providing the
impetus for specific changes. In addition, the danger exists that the
procedure of remedial formulation would degenerate into a "hidden
ball" scenerio, with the defendants formulating plans, and the courts
sending them away to try again if they are "unsatisfactory." Finally,
the threat of judicial condemnation of a public institution with its re30. The adherence to the standard of dejure segregation has led the Court in recent
years to have to confront the difficult questions of burdens of proof, proper inferences from
facts proved, and the residual effects of past discrimination, in order to define the barrier it
had erected between defacto and dejure segregation. The Court first suggested that it
would be willing to allow broad inferences from the facts proved, meaning that a relatively
limited primafacie case could justify broad remedies, in Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413
U.S. 189 (1973). The Court, however, began to limit its willingness to draw inferences and
allow limited factual cases to support broad remedial decrees in Milliken v. Bradley, 418
U.S. 717 (1974) (Milliken I), Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977) (Dayton
I), and School Dist. of Omaha v. United States, 433 U.S. 667 (1977). In the October 1979
Term, the Court seemed to open the door again to inferences across time and space from
proven acts to support broad remedies in school desegregation cases, in Columbus Bd. of
Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979) and Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526
(1979) (Dayton II).
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suiting complete disbandment would appear to be an even greater interference with public policy than would judicially-instigated reforms.
Any sizeable public institution serves many purposes, goals and constituencies at once; that is the reason why judicial examination for discriminatory intent is so difficult. The courts, in these school cases, may
find a defect in one part of a bureaucracy or its decision-making process, yet, to throw the baby out with the bath water-to shut down the
schools, release prisoners, condemn the mentally ill to the exploitation
they inevitably face on the streets-on the basis of this finding would
overstep the bounds of court legitimacy far more clearly than would the
reformist aspects of remedial orders.
One final problem faced by the courts in considering such an approach is the limitations upon their political power. It is unclear
whether the courts could have effectively articulated a set of specific
goals for integration in the mid-1960s, or whether they had enough political clout to force acceptance of those goals. By focusing generally
on the process of integration, by identifying and enforcing indirect,
means-oriented standards of remedy, they avoided the political powder-keg of explicitly articulated goals. They were able to proceed
slowly by tinkering with the machinery, working towards the hazy goal
of "unitary non-segregated school systems," rather than translating that
goal into concrete terms. To focus on process, however, meant that the
courts had to identify the elements of the bureaucratic structure which
were in need of repair.
Three new burdens, therefore, were placed upon the traditional
participants in the adjudicatory model: (1) the traditional plaintiff had
to recognize, evaluate and effectively present to the court a legal analysis of the bureaucratic actions which led to the violation; (2) the court
had to accept the legitimacy of the plaintiff's traditional role in the litigation, especially in the formulation of the remedial decree, in the face
of the broad impact of ongoing public institutions; and (3) the court
had to deal with the complexity of formulating, enforcing and evaluating a remedial order which would effectively manipulate such a process. The failure of traditional methods of adjudication to deal
satisfactorily with these problems led to the emergence of the special
master as a new participant in the adjudication of these cases.
B.

The Default of the Traditional Plaintiff

The difficulties involved in analyzing the process of discrimination
by bureaucratic defendants were too great for the traditional partyplaintiff. In addition, since the reformation of public institutions af-
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fected more than just the plaintiff(s), the court's reliance upon party
representatives in formulating a remedy made it nearly impossible to
do justice for those actually affected.
While the detection and presentation of a case challenging the activities of a bureaucratic institution is difficult under any circumstances,
it may well be impossible for the individual plaintiff. Although the
general, amorphous discriminatory results of decision-making and implementation processes may be obvious to any individual who has had
contact with the system, an individual-student, parent, teacher or administrator-sees only one small part of the whole. Such an individual
might have no knowledge of the decision-making process, seeing only
its results. The most sophisticated victim might be unable to piece together a claim which would rise to the level of legal proof. Indeed, a
student or other individual temporarily associated with a school system
is much less likely to comprehend the process or to maintain a desire to
sue than one whose personal contact with the organization is less fleeting. The problem is even more apparent in the northern urban schools,
where the administrative operations which violate the Fourteenth
Amendment are more subtle and hence less susceptible to detection by
the casual observer. Because the "victims" have only a temporary
stake in the school system, it is unlikely any individual will grapple
successfully with these complex issues of cause and effect in a bureaucracy before that individual passes out of the system. As time passes,
the issue loses its personal urgency for the victims and their desire for
specific reform is subsumed into the general discontent with public and
private institutions.
The problem is compounded by the disproportionate impact that
school systems have on the poor. These relatively unsophisticated potential plaintiffs are neither likely to understand the subtleties of the
chain of responsibility for systemic discrimination, nor likely to be in a
position to devote the time and energy needed to press such a suit.
Given the limited impact that even a successful suit will have on their
own lives, there is little incentive for the poor to bring suit. The cruel
irony is that the very constitutional violation involved-unequal educational opportunity-is at least partially responsible for placing the potential plaintiffs in a position from which they are powerless to
complain.
A related problem is the nature of the relief available. In desegregation cases, the relief is prospective in nature. Precisely because of the
breadth of the impact of public institutions on society, it is unlikely that
courts would ever undertake the redistribution of wealth that damage
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awards would necessarily entail, especially if the theory behind such
awards was carried beyond school systems to the sometimes amorphous disadvantages created, enhanced or supported by various public
institutions. Given the reformist, prospective nature of the relief to be
expected, and the temporary nature of the interface of victim and institution, the potential for effective action by our traditional plaintiff is
greatly diminished.
Not only does the traditional plaintiff default for these functional
reasons in this new type of litigation, but these factors at least partially
undermine the normative grounds for reliance on the party-plaintiff.
Part of the reason for relying on the party-plaintiff in traditional adjudication was the notion that the injury and the remedy had a discrete
impact upon the parties and no wider impact; therefore, the coercive
power of the state could justly be wielded and molded by the affected
parties. While many of the concepts which underlie the traditional litigative paradigm may have always been artificial and mythical, they
certainly become so in the context of the school desegregation cases.
These cases have forced the courts to recognize the inappropriateness
of many of the previously accepted elements of traditional adjudication. For instance, as it became increasingly obvious that the reform of
public institutions affected many groups and interests in the community, extending far beyond the limits of an individual plaintiff, the inappropriateness of the notion of discrete impact was recognized. The
normative basis for maintaining the focus of litigation on the individual plaintiff, particularly in the remedial stage of the litigation, was
weakened, if not destroyed. Even in the liability stage, the discriminatory impact of the bureaucratic processes was not individual- but
group-oriented; consequently, the reliance on the individual plaintiff
seemed normatively, as well as functionally, inappropriate.31
Part of the solution to the dilemma faced in these cases was found
with the emergence of organizational and group plaintiffs. The relaxation of the rules on standing, the increasing use of class actions and the
growing control which organizations like the NAACP exercised in
bringing suits, all served to counteract the inequities that existed between the governmental organizations "acting" in violation of the Con32
stitution, and their affected victims.
31. See Boyer, supra note 27; Note, supra note 28.

32. "Acting" is in quotes because it applies the coherence of an individual to an organization, one of the very mistakes of perception which this article means to highlight and to
dispute. The term refers to the net result of the series of decisions and implementation ac-

tions made within and by the organization. Potts v. Flax, 313 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1963) illustrates some of the problems with identifying "acts" of a bureaucratic institution, imputing
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C. The Failure of Legitimacy
Organizational plaintiffs like the NAACP, working nominally
through individually injured students, came to fulfill many of the new
functional needs of the injured parties. Such organizational plaintiffs
were capable of the new kinds of systemic analysis and evidentiary
presentations demanded by these suits. As organizations, these plaintiffs were better equipped to represent the broad interests of Blacks in
desegregation cases than individual students, or even groups of students, who had only temporary and limited contact with the discriminatory system. As organizations, the new party-plaintiffs were also
better equipped than the traditional plaintiff to collect, evaluate, and
use the existing information to prove the connection between segregative results and failings in the institutional decision making processes.
They could call upon the resources needed to coordinate, examine and
analyze the many individual decisions and actions which, when
presented in an integrated manner, triggered the finding of a constitutional violation.
In the early days, this task involved developing legal theory, rather
than developing the factual situations. After the theory was firmly established subsequent to Brown v. Board of Education,33 a long period
ensued in which effective remedies had to be developed. As the battleground moved north, more attention had to be paid to ferreting out and
coherently presenting the individual acts within and by the school bureaucracies which, in toto, could be said to produce a "deliberate" unconstitutional act of discrimination by the school system. This task was,
further complicated by the need to identify whether the culpable actions lay in the decision-making or in the implementation processes of
the school bureaucracy, or in some combination of both.
If, however, this task demanded an organizational, rather than an
individual plaintiff to effectively frame the issues and produce the
proof, the advisability of leaving the suit in the hands of an organization such as the NAACP was undermined, especially in developing
proper remedial orders. As the intricacies of proving a discrimination
case and evolving remedies began to push the court into many uncharted areas of policy and administration, the possibility that the organizational plaintiffs would not protect the interests of all the injured
good or bad faith, or trying to identify policies or activities of the institution itself as opposed
to the thought and actions of individual members. See also Note, Developments in the LawClass Actions, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1318 (1976).

33. 347 U.S. at 483.
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parties began to loom larger. 34 Yet a neutral plaintiff was not the answer. A strong advocate was needed to counter both the bureaucratic
defendant's powerful defense, and the natural difficulty of proving such
a case in a system of law structured around the traditional litigation
paradigm.
The breadth of the remedial decrees compounded the problem. It
was increasingly apparent that virtually the whole polis was affected
either directly or indirectly by the systemic reforms ordered by the
court. Although it may be argued that such effects are present in any
court interference with the administration of public institutions, it is
clear that, as the courts widened the scope of their inquiry and detailed
the necessary remedial actions in areas related to educational services,
the inadequacy of representation by even organizational plaintiffs became more obvious.35
Because this new form of plaintiff opened up new problem areas, it
encouraged the courts to discard the chains of traditional adjudication
and look to new sources of help. Once the old form of adjudication
was defacto discarded, and old ideas no longer seemed appropriate to
the new type of case confronting the federal courts, the need for greater
judicial intervention to protect the interests of the many persons not
represented by the parties became apparent. The well-recognized need
for judicial restraint, both to limit the power of the court and to preserve the court's flexibility in its role as final arbiter, however, remained
in the path of direct, active judicial oversight.
The Department of Justice and, to a lesser extent, HEW solved
this problem. These executive departments provided the federal courts
the parties they needed. In the early 1960s, these Departments' commitment to desegregation was strong. They had the structure and the
ability to digest information, to meet the challenges of the school systems' bureaucracies, and to present this information to the court in a
form which it could process within the confines of traditional adjudication. Unlike the NAACP, the federal executive departments appeared
to represent and consider the legitimate interests of all the people who
would be affected by these major institutional changes.36
Then came 1969 and a new administration. Suddenly the courts
34. For a recent argument against the control exercised in desegregation suits by organizational plaintiffs like the NAACP, see Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and
Client Interests in SchoolDesegregationLitigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as Bell].
35. See Casper, Lawyers Be/ore the Supreme Court: Civil Liberties and Civil ights,
1957-66, 22 STAN. L. REV. 487 (1970).
36. See 0. Fiss, supra note 4, at 15; Fiss, The Fate ofAn Idea Ifhose Time Has Come:
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could no longer rely on the executive departments. Their response was
to develop an internal auxiliary to assist them in doing the desired job.
As would be expected, the courts turned to old familiar forms, and
adapted them to the new circumstances.
D.

The Lack of Remedial Standards

The real source of judicial frustration in desegregation cases was
the remedial order. While traditionally there was more room for judicial action in this area, the problems presented by this new form of
litigation outpaced judicial solutions, at least at first.
In the traditional adjudication paradigm, the remedy flowed directly from the violation. The desegregation cases, unfortunately, were
not so easily solved. In many of the cases immediately following Brown
v. Boardof Education,3 7 the court simply invoked Brown and enjoined
the school districts from continued discriminatory practices. However,
the recalcitrance of the school districts, the social intransigency of discrimination, and the bureaucratic nature of the defendant organizations made for easy avoidance of even token desegregation.3 8
The nature of the defendant and the offense simply did not lend
themselves to the remedial formulations of the court. Such remedial
orders, based on a conception of parties as single, rational actors who
could be ordered to do something and be held accountable for a failure
to obey, did not demand much activism from the court or from the
plaintiff. The liability findings would logically suggest the remedy,
often explicitly advocated by the plaintiff, and the judge would simply
select the remedy from the limited universe of appropriate actions. Little, if any, follow-up was necessary, since the likelihood that the defendant could avoid compliance without detection was minimal. The
plaintiff was either compensated or not; the defect was either repaired
or not; the penalty was either paid or not. It was a relatively simple
matter for the plaintiff in the paradigmatic case (1) to recognize noncompliance and (2) to demonstrate non-compliance to the court. The
court could easily use its power of contempt to force the recalcitrant
party to act, because the individuals who were responsible for the failure to comply could easily be identified. Little effort was needed, after
the finding of liability, to conclude the matter.
Again, this approach may have reflected poorly the reality of even
AnfidiscriminationLaw in the Second Decade after Brown v. Boardof Education,41 U.
L. REV. 742 (1974).
37. 347 U.S. at 483.

38. See G.

ORFIELD,

supra note 20.

CHI.
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the traditional lawsuit; in the school desegregation cases, the divergence between theory and reality resulted in the breakdown of the effectiveness of the traditional litigation model and forced the courts to
confront the illusionary quality of this approach. In these cases, the
systemic nature of the injury meant that a variety of measures could be
taken, and had to be taken, in order to produce an outcome which, at
best, fulfilled the very amorphous, value-laden and ill-defined standard
of equal education, quality education and non-discriminatory education.39
The other side of this dilemma was that the defendant institutions
could easily fill in the details of the amorphous goals and the means to
achieve them in a manner that subverted the intent of the court. Part of
the difficulty faced by the courts in dealing with these recalcitrant
school districts was the lack of detailed knowledge and resources to
counter effectively the defendants' claims that, in order to preserve all
the other important goals and functions of the school systems, desegregation at a snail's pace was the only proper remedial approach.
The courts moved towards more explicit and detailed orders as it
became apparent that the school systems could easily avoid or subvert
less complete decrees. The steady progression of intervention continues to this day, as the more complex causes of segregation in the North
demand more complex solutions. The detail has grown from a simple
order to desegregate, to a specified form of plan, to a specified plan, to
a plan that includes magnet schools, tracking, transportation, police
services and the like.4 °
As the courts' remedial orders have become more detailed and allencompassing, so has the detail of information needed to accurately
evaluate the situation. Defendants now often include state and local
agencies as well as school systems, so that the courts can get information from those agencies and coordinate their actions to assure desegregation.4 1 Extensive orders for documentation and for reports on
39. See 0. Fiss, supra note 4, at 7-37.
40. See notes 9 & 20 supra. The Cleveland case, Reed v. Rhodes. is a prime example of

how far the courts have come in this area. After the finding of discrimination in August
1976, the Court became deeply involved in a detailed review of the school system's financial
management, its purchasing decisions, the lunch program, the types of buses available and
the possible uses of public transportation, and other matters which at one time seemed ancillary to desegregation litigation. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
41. In Hart v. Community School Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699, (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 512
F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975), the defendants included state and local housing officials, the Police
Commissioner, the Commissioner of Recreation, and the Metropolitan Transit Authority.
In United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 332 F. Supp. 655 (S.D. Ind. 1971), remanded,
466 F.2d 573 (7th Cir. 1972), on remand,368 F. Supp. 1191 (S.D. Ind. 1973), af'd,474 F.2d
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various programs and operations are also issued to the defendants.
Some of these orders are so detailed as to direct the defendants to include specific information in their charts.4 2 In addition, the remedial
portion of the trial can now last for years-often longer than the liability stage.43 This reflects not only the complexity of the process of formation of the remedial decree, but also the increasing recognition by
the courts that the flexibility of systemic reform requires continued
scrutiny throughout the implementation of the remedy. The courts
must both oversee compliance to avoid bureaucratic subversion, and
allow for reformulation of their own demands when faced with insurmountable problems or conflicts of goals and values.
No single judge, however, could be expected to have the resources,
inclination or the time to pursue this sort of detailed and extensive
analysis. Nor would he be in a position to conduct so thorough an
investigation, bound as he would be by the rules and procedures of the
formal adversarial setting. The reliance, therefore, which the judge has
placed in the parties to help analyze and structure the remedial decree
raised the same problems of capacity and legitimacy which arose in the
determination of liability.' The necessary breadth of the remedial orders magnified these problems, as the range of interests touched by
public institutions and public policy considerations increased. The
courts were cut adrift. The systemic nature of the violation made the
liability stage complex; it made evaluation of performance, formulation
of the decree and evaluation of implementation rootless and amorphous. Judges were being drawn into policy-formation roles where
none of the traditional judicial standards of precedent, or other criteria
for evaluating choices, were available as measures of success.
Both the Department of Justice and HEW also helped to fill this
void. Because the role taken by the judge could be more active than in
the liability stage, there emerged a coordinated system for molding
proper remedial decrees. The Department of Justice and HEW pro81 (7th Cir. 1973), cerl. denied, 413 U.S. 920 (1973), the district court joined to the suit
interested governmental bodies from the towns and counties surrounding Indianapolis, the
state attorney general, and the Metropolitan Development Commission of Marion County.
332 F. Supp. at 678-80.
42. See note 18 supra.

43. In Reed v. Rhodes, for instance, the complaint was filed on December 12, 1973, the
trial began November 24, 1975, a decision was handed down on August 8, 1976, and the
major component of the desegregation plan, busing, did not begin until the opening of the
Cleveland schools in the fall of 1979. The other cases cited at notes 9 and 20 supra also
involved long periods of remedial formulation and implementation, most of which continue
up to the present.
44. See text accompanying notes 29-31 supra.
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vided not only the concrete standard for the courts but also the kind of
investigatory and analytical resources needed to evaluate and revise the
standards of enforcement.4 5 The withdrawal of the executive branch
from an active role in desegregation litigation after 1969 left the courts
again facing these problems with the development and implementation
of remedial orders. The increasing complexity and scope of the northern school desegregation cases, moreover, demanded even greater policy administration by the courts in the formulation and enforcement of
the decrees.
IV.

The Role of the Special Master-A Conceptual
Explanation

The special master is used by the courts to solve the problems created by the gap between the old adjudicatory model and the realities of
the school desegregation cases. The special master functions as a fusion of the traditional roles of party-plaintiff and judge in response to
the demands of this new type of litigation. This development enables
the special master to assume much the same role as that played by the
Department of Justice in earlier desegregation cases. In fact, the emergence of the Department of Justice as a plaintiff in the 1960s foreshadowed the structural design into which the special master would step.
The Department utilized the resources of an administrative organization to gather and evaluate information, as well as providing the elements of advocacy and activism vital to the traditional plaintiff. Also
integral to the role of the Department of Justice was its perceived independence as representative of the national, rather than representative
of any particular, interest; this is the trait traditionally attributed to the
judge, as the impartial arbitrator of the many interests to be reconciled
in a suit.
The relationship between the role played by the Department and
the traditional roles of plaintiff and judge remained more shadowy and
less explicit than its later counterpart with the special master. To begin
with, the relative explicitness of the violations in the early, southern
state cases left little room to question the Justice Department's role in
the liability stage. Certainly the emphasis in the liability segment of
the trial was on the single-mindedness of the party in ferreting out
information and obtaining a conviction. Perhaps it was this early emphasis on the advocacy elements of its role which led to the Department's entrance into the litigation in the form of party-plaintiff rather
45. See 0. Fiss, supra note 4, at 22-23; Fiss, supra note 36.
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than in a more formally neutral guise, such as an aid to the court or as
an expert assistant to the litigants.
Nevertheless, it was the courts' perception of the Department's
lawyers as more impartial than the other plaintiffs, as more removed
and rational, that led to the courts' great deference to the Department.
In fact, the Department of Justice often usurped the position of the
actual plaintiff-to say nothing of the position of the defendant. As a
result, the adversarial structure often seemed to collapse into a working
partnership between the courts and the Department.4 6 As a defense to
dejure segregation became impossible, the focus of assistance given by
the Department of Justice, and looked for by the courts, shifted to the
remedial arena. The courts, however, felt less constrained by their
traditional role in this area, and so the coordinated action of the courts
and the Department became even more explicit. Indeed, the federal
judiciary appeared to be abandoning its constitutional role as a check
to assume
on the executive branch of government, while it appeared
47
the role of coordinator of federal desegregation policy.
Neither plaintiff nor defendant, however, was in a position to complain. The defendants had angered the courts by using legal tactics to
delay integration. The plaintiffs, while perhaps on occasion disgruntled, often realized that they were well served by the resources and the
respectability that the Department of Justice brought to the case.
Moreover, just as the judicial elements of the Department's role resulted in the courts showing it great deference, its activism in desegregation assured the courts that the information they received from the
Department and the structure of the advice the Department gave the
courts in both the liability and remedial stages would be designed to
counteract the intransigence of the school districts and thereby promote
the ultimate goal of the litigation.
In the late 1960s, when it became apparent that the Department
would no longer fulfill that role nor bring its resources to bear, the
courts looked elsewhere to find an assistant who would serve a similar
function. 48 The assumption of this function by the special master for
the courts, did not, of course, result in an exact replication of the role
played by the Department of Justice. A number of factors contributed
to differences in their roles. One was the liability-remedy structure of
the judicial considerations. Elements of this structure led to the use of
special masters in the latter, but not the former, stage of litigation.
46. See note 36 supra.
47. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
48. See note 21 and accompanying text supra.
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There were a number of reasons why the liability stage could more
reliably be left in the hands of the organizational plaintiff, without
much concern for the limited breadth of representation. First, the elements of proof in the liability stage of the desegregation suit were more
clearly recognized and delineated by 1969, even in the northern de
facto segregation cases, than were the elements of proof appropriate to
the remedial decree. Second, the many interests to be considered in the
reform of public institutions did not need to be considered in the liability stage because the existence of a constitutional violation touching on
only one distinct segment of the community is the essence of liability
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, the courts themselves were
more comfortable with an activist stance in the remedial, rather than
the liability, stage of the suit. Once they began to rely on a judicial
auxiliary molded and controlled by the court, rather than on a separate,
autonomous, albeit court-appointed auxiliary, the legitimacy of using
such a person in the liability stage became more questionable. The
courts had to maintain their judicial legitimacy by remaining neutral
when passing upon the ultimate question of guilt or innocence.4 9 After
a determination of liability, however, direct participation by the court
in the proceedings, through a court-appointed person, seemed more
easily justified.
The nature of the defendants also encouraged the use of the special master solely in the remedial stage of the litigation. While the difficulty of proving the liability of governmental institutions for
segregation grew with the shift in emphasis to northern school districts,
the court could still rely on the myth that the defendant acted as a
rational individual to draw inferences from various "acts" 5 of the
5
school bureaucracy-such as building decisions and transfer policies. '
In dealing with remedies for bureaucratic discrimination, however, the
49. The courts have eased the burdens of the plaintiffs by allowing liberal discovery, by
doing much of their own analysis and by drawing their own inferences from the data
presented at trial. An examination of the cases cited at note 9 supra and the district court
opinion in United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 368 F. Supp. 1191 (S.D. Ind. 1973),
demonstrates the lengths to which district courts believe they must go in such cases in laying
out the factual predicates and resultant inferences which support the finding of liability.
Maps, statistical analysis and lengthy quotations from the trial record are not unusual.
50. See note 32 supra.
51. In Reed v. Rhodes, supra note 9, the first district court opinion in the Indianapolis
case, supra note 41, and Morgan v. Kerrigan, supra note 9, the courts all relied heavily on
such inferences of "rationality". The Supreme Court, as indicated in the cases cited at note
30 supra,has dealt in a more problematic manner with the issue of drawing inferences based
on a model of organizations acting like rational individuils. See also Note, Reading the
Mind ofthe School Board"SegregativeIntent andthe De Facto/DeJure Distinction, 86 YALE
L.J. 317 (1976); G. ALLISON, THE ESSENCE OF DECISION (1971).
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courts could not ignore the reality of the complex process by which
decisions were made and implemented. Nor could they ignore the
complex way by which other political policy processes affected, and
were affected by, the school institutions. The remedial stage, therefore,
demanded not only a more searching analysis but also consideration of
the many idiosyncrasies of each particular situation, including the inter-relationships and intra-relationships of the bureaucracies.
The conceptual situation was identified and its solution suggested
in a Columbia Law Review article published at the time that the courts
first were introducing the new actor:
The peculiar nature of relief in civil rights cases suggests that
they are not the ordinary kind of case. Suits against discriminatory practices arguably bear a closer resemblance to actions in
rem than to actions in personam. What is really being determined is the interests of all the world in the alleged discriminatory practice. The decree should be calculated to produce a plan
which will attempt to reconcile the diverse interests in the subject
matter of the suit. The practice of retaining jurisdiction to oversee the implementation of the plan recognizes that the court's jurisdiction is as much over the practice as the people. Similarly,
the court should be willing to make liberal use of guardians to
represent absent interests (f. Hatch v. Riggs, 361 F.2d 559 (D.C.
Cir. 1966)) and special masters to identify the various competing
interests. These devices will often be essential to the exercise of
jurisdiction over the challenged practice.52
In some ways the special master is more ideally suited for the tasks
of school desegregation cases in the 1970s than is the Department of
Justice. As an individual brought into the litigation on an ad hoc basis,
the master is not as resourceful as an institution like the Department of
Justice. The master has neither the cumulative experience and knowledge of a continuing bureaucracy nor the track record of effectiveness
to help establish his legitimacy. Nevertheless, the unusual remedial decrees in the desegregation cases of the 1970s are best fashioned by an
individual who is not wedded to previously advocated positions or to
prior remedial solutions. The master is less susceptible to a continuing
organization's tendency to categorize and treat uniformly all similar
situations; he is therefore more likely to look for the subtle and often
crucial differences in individual situations. Certainly the breadth and
fine tuning of the northern cases demonstrate the necessity of that ad
hoc flexibility.
The individual nature of the special master may be a decided advantage over the Department of Justice in other ways as well. The
52. Note, supra note 28, at 910-11 n.106.
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courts certainly are more comfortable with the synthesis and presentation by an individual of information upon which the courts must pass
judgment. For not only is the individual closer to the traditional adjudicatory model of a party, but the use of the individual special master
also avoids the problem of the bureaucratic voice of the Department of
Justice, speaking to the courts-part of the very problem which the
courts are trying to overcome in the first instance in these cases. In a
sense this is simply explicit recognition of one of the failings of the
traditional model of adjudication, because one can argue that the individual internalizes the same processes of compromise of values, filtration of information to fit pre-established beliefs, standard operating
procedures, projection, and other malaises which we explicitly identify
in the process by which an organization "speaks." The courts are, nevertheless, comfortable with the internalization of these problems in the
individual, perhaps because adjudication would otherwise be impossible. But the more explicit manifestations of these distortions in the bureaucratic "voice" may seem unnecessary and avoidable to the courts.
The ad hoc, individual master avoids this problem.53
The master provides not only the advocacy normally associated
with parties but also the plaintiff's single-minded immersion into the
issues of the case. The special master does not suffer from any of the
traditional temporal and procedural constraints of the judge. The special master can survey, interview, investigate, hold hearings, examine
records, and more, in order to understand all aspects and elements of
the bureaucratic structure which produced and reinforced the discriminatory result. He can gather all the threads, tie them together, and then
present them in a coherent manner to the court. Like a party, the
master is not aloof and disinterested, but concerned and knowledgeable. The courts have not appointed former judges, but lawyers who are
experts in desegregation and community planning. These masters are,
like a party and unlike a judge, free to reach out into the community
53. The use of an internal mechanism of the judicial branch eliminates the explicit collapse of the separation of the judicial and executive branches, an element of the constitutional structure of government which has long been considered fundamental. This, again,
may seem to be subterfuge, in that the judicial assumption of executive functions occurs
implicitly, rather than the explicit collapse of functions apparent in the earlier use of the
Department of Justice. However, such an analysis confuses two different elements ofjudicial
and executive separation: 1) the judicial usurpation of executive policy formulation functions; and 2) the co-ordination ofjudicial and executive power to bring to bear pressure on a
commonly conceived evil. Whatever the validity of the first criticism which would apply to
the use of either actor, at least the use of the special master eliminates the applicability of the
second criticism, one which I would contend presents a more serious threat to the rights of
both individuals and the public-at-large.
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other experts for analysis and expand the agenda
for opinion, call upon
54
of considerations.
In addition to providing the advocacy of a plaintiff, the special
master can buttress that advocacy with force unavailable to a plaintiff.
The special master can use the coercive power of the court to collect
data and generate effective responses to his investigations. Although
the parties have had available for a long time the coercive power of the
courts to aid in the development of information, in the form of discovery,55 the masters have been able to use that power much more widely,
informally and flexibly. The courts have almost always endorsed such
activity of the special masters, no matter how widely the masters have
ranged or how intrusive they might have appeared. For the masters are
more than parties; they are perceived by all the participants in the litigation as having the power of the court, at least in their investigatory
function.
Perhaps more importantly to the courts, the special master has the
broader perspective attributed to the judge in traditional adjudication.
The master, while acting as an advocate of desegregation, does not exclusively represent the interests of either the nominal plaintiff or the de
facto organizational plaintiff. Because of the overriding public interests he must consider in fashioning a remedy, the special master, like
the judge, is one step removed from the narrow self-interest which is
the traditional stance of the party-plaintiff.
The master does see his primary constituency as the class of plaintiffs. This much of the traditional adjudicatory model is preserved, because the threshold responsibility of the special master is to remedy the
violation found in the liability stage. The master, in other words, is
working under at least one clear mandate, dictated by the process
which invests him with his functions and power: that of formulating
effective relief.56
While the court can accept the representations of the plaintiff relating to the discriminatory injury, the master cannot passively accept
the plaintiff's advocacy of a remedial solution as representative of the
desires of the class of people he or she represents in the liability stage.
If the court felt confident in that approach, there would be no need for
a special master, or at best, he would play a minor clerical role in the
litigation. The breadth of available remedies, however, makes it clear
that different approaches would affect even members of the plaintiff's
54. See, e.g., notes 9, 14, 15 & 18 supra.
55. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
56. See note 9 supra.
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class differently, let alone upon the broader class of persons directly or
indirectly affected by any changes in the structure of the school system
and related government services.F
The special master, therefore, combines the flexibility and advocacy of a party-plaintiff with the independence and coercive power of
the court in order to bring the judicial system closer to representing
these varied interests in its deliberations, as is ultimately required by
the traditional notion of the judicial function. This conceptual description of the special master helps to illuminate the relationship of the
judge to the master. The courts have helped fuse the roles of judge and
party in the master by choosing experts and advocates, allowing them
flexibility and backing them up with the courts' coercive power. The
courts, however, have not in all instances rubber-stamped the recommendations of the special masters. Recognizing the special masters'
court-like detachment and independence, the courts have shown great
deference to their work. But, recognizing the masters' party-like attributes, the courts have always allowed the other parties to submit their
own recommendations and to critique those submitted by the special
master. Thus the courts have exercised and preserved their ultimate
discretion to pass upon the master's report in its entirety. 58
In an important sense, this preservation of discretion by the courts
is crucial to the success of the special master. It enables a court to combine elements of party and judge without compromising its own position as ultimate arbiter. It is central to our notion of due process that
the person rendering final judgment not have an interest in the matter
before him. Only then are we confident that he will bring to bear only
his rationality and sense of justice to render a judgment, unpolluted by
self-interest or emotional commitment. While this element of traditional adjudication is probably the one most subject to attack as mythical, we do attempt to eliminate the cruder forms of self-interest from
those who sit as judges, at least insofar as we can without paralyzing
the judicial institutions. For the court, therefore, to move towards assuming the attributes of a party, even in the remedial stage, would be to
impair the legitimacy of its passing ultimate judgment on the remedial
plan.
There is seemingly great tension of constitutional dimensions lurking not far beneath the surface here. If the courts, by establishing the
master as a fusion of judge and party, are responding to an inadequacy
of the traditional paradigm which separated the functions of the two
57. See note 34 supra.
58. See text accompanying notes 15-18 supra.
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actors, is not this very reformation an admission that the judge is inadequately positioned to pass judgment upon the results? This is basically
a reformulation of the substantive criticism of the new judicial activism, which points to formal innovations as evidence of the illegitimacy
of the enterprise.5 9 This tension, however, dissolves upon close examination of the issue. The special master combines elements of advocacy
and independence that enable him to generate information and analysis such that he may avoid the pitfalls faced by the nominal and de
facto plaintiffs in these cases. This very movement away from a judicial attitude, however, means that the dangers of distortion of perspective which advocacy can entail may creep into the work of the special
master.6 0 The judge, on the other hand, preserves his impartiality,
which, with the special master as an auxiliary, he is better able to exercise. The judge can now exercise his judgment in a structured universe
of information more closely paralleling the input of information in
traditional adjudication.
In addition, the lack of finality of the special master's report palliates the judge-like qualities of his work and power, and thereby allows
the special master more leeway to exercise his party-like investigatory
and analytical functions. In these circumstances, the special master
will feel less obliged, and the parties will feel less threatened by his
failure to preserve all the trappings of impartiality-all concerned
know that the parties will get another crack at the still-impartial final
arbiter.
Just as the solution to the problems in the liability stage did not
initially solve the problems presented in the remedial formulation stage
(they may, in fact, have been responsible in some ways for increasing
those problems6") the solutions of the remedial formulation stage did
not leave implementation simple and problem-free. The same historical and analytical factors which caused the dilemmas posed by the finding of liability and the formation of a remedy-the inadequacy of the
party-plaintiffs, the nature of the bureaucratic violation, the lack of
standards for evaluating success-left the courts with a new problem in
implementation. The inadequacy of the old procedures and actors in
the liability and remedial formulation stages also plagued the implementation stage. The complexity of the bureaucratic operation made
monitoring by outside parties difficult. The traditional withdrawal of
the courts from the problem after the issuance of the remedial order
59. See text accompanying note 7 supra.
60. See Berger, supra note 14.
61. See text accompanying notes 34-35 supra.
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soon proved impossible, as southern, and later northern, school districts
continued to place obstacles in the way of effective implementation.
On the other hand, recognition of the many competing considerations
and interests in these public institutions and the diffused nature of action and inaction made the blunt instrument of contempt of court inappropriate and probably ineffective. In addition, there was a recognition
by the courts that the remedial order, with its complexity and balancing
of competing considerations, needed managerial fine-tuning, with continued appropriate readjustments, without penalizing the bureaucrats.
The courts had to differentiate, of course, between the impossibility of
implementation, which would call for policy adjustment, and bad faith
obstruction. This was a task not easily done by a judge with other
pressing matters to consider.
It is not surprising, therefore, to see elements of this same fusion of
judicial and party functions in the newest personnel of the federal
courts in desegregation cases, the 62court officer placed into the school
bureaucracy to oversee its reform.
The considerations behind, and therefore the conceptual structure
of this new actor vary from the earlier stages of the litigation. Considerations of judicial restraint are all but gone by-the time the remedial
stage is reached; the court's power to enforce injunctions is, in fact,
relatively unencumbered by procedural protections.6 3 The court, therefore, does not appoint a bureaucrat because the judge's personal oversight would threaten the court's legitimacy, but rather because it is
impossible, due to time and functional restraints, for the court itself to
generate effectively the necessary information and feedback.
The two central elements of advocacy and independence remain
fused in the new court auxiliary. He gets his sense of mission, to fulfill
the mandate of the remedial order, from the court, just as the special
master gets his mandate from the finding of liability. This implementation bureaucrat, like the special master, is free from the constraints of
the court and is thus able to reach into the bureaucratic process to develop information and to reform the institution. Like the special
master, this new court auxiliary sees his responsibility as being to the
broader interests of all the affected parties, not just the plaintiffs. As
with the special master, the court effectively- preserves its own impartiality and discretion by delegating the responsibility for direct supervision of the remedy, thereby protecting the court from co-option by the
62. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
63. See, e.g., Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967) (concerning the irrelevancy of constitutional defenses in the face of citations for contempt of court).
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bureaucracy, the inevitable risk of using the new court appointed bureaucrat.
It remains to be seen how effective this new actor will bef' The
courts have certainly followed the lessons of the past. By creating an
auxiliary court official who may be able to penetrate the problems
presented by the bureaucratic process-and who will contribute the advocacy skills, investigative desires and flexibility of the traditional
party-plaintiff as well as the independence and power of the judiciary--the courts have forged a new and effective method of dealing with
the problems of implementation while, at the same time, protecting the
essential features of traditional litigation.
V.

Conclusion-What of Legitimacy?

The question of legitimacy6 5 arises with any structural change in
the institutions by which societies govern themselves. In our society,
such questions are formulated in terms of the constitutional validity of
the actions of the institution, because our heritage suggests that the
Constitution is to serve as the mediating device between our value systeni and our legal and governmental institutions, particularly on the
federal level but increasingly on the state and local levels as well. The
legitimacy question is seldom asked, however, of institutions that do
not change, even as the circumstances in which they operate, and from
which they derive their legitimacy, evolve. Much of the conflict between our value system and our functioning institutions is accepted
simply because the institutions are so well established in our society.
They derive their continued legitimacy from their historical legitimacy,
64. As indicated at note 19 supra, the record of the deputy superintendent in charge of
desegregation has been a mixed one. One deputy superintendent has been forced to resign,
but it remains true that the position has served to facilitate the court's successful implementation of the remedial plan. The dualism of the deputy superintendent's role is evident,
moreover, in a number of incidents which have arisen since the establishment of the position. In April of 1978, for instance, Judge Battisti ordered that the deputy superintendent,
Dr. Leftwich, be given control of the business, computer, research and development, and
community relations departments of the school system's administration. He also ordered
that the School Board hire seven people chosen by Dr. Leftwich to fill top administrative
posts. N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 1978, § 1,at 22, col. 6. In March, 1979, on the other hand, when
the NAACP asked that the School Board be found in contempt of court for establishing all
Black classes for 300 junior high school students who were being bused into previously all
white schools, it was the deputy superintendent in charge of desegregation, Dr. Margaret
Fleming, who responded to the chaige by stating that five of seven such classes had already
been dismantled and the other two were in the process of being eliminated. Id., Mar. 28,
1979, § A, at 18, col. 6.
65. For a similar evaluation in a related area of remedial innovation, see Harris, The
Title VIl,4dministrator: A Case Study in JudcialFlexibility,60 CORNELL L. REV. 53 (1974).
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often until some traumatic event overwhelms this inertia. On the other
hand, it is perhaps for this reason that it is particularly appropriate to
examine questions of legitimacy in times of flux because, after the institutional changes have become part of the framework of society, we
tend to accept them without further question. It is nevertheless important to keep in mind that the failure of institutions to change in order to
preserve more fundamental values in the face of changing circumstances, should raise at least as many questions of legitimacy as the
attempt to respond by institutions.
The question of legitimacy particularly pervades a consideration
of the special master because of the obvious relationship of public-law
litigation, and its effects on the forms of adjudication, to one of our
fundamental beliefs about the structure of constitutional government:
the separation of powers. That phrase is not used here in its narrow
context,6 6 but rather as the broader and more fundamental notion that
certain actions lie outside the competency of the courts and lie within
the competency of the legislative and administrative branches of government. These questions of legitimacy also arise from a belief that,
under our constitutional arrangements, it is the purview and the specialty of elected representatives, not judges, to do the kind of interestbalancing and policy fine-tuning which the courts find themselves doing in these school desegregation cases. This issue lies at the heart of
all discussion of the constitutional legitimacy of judicial reformation of
public institutions. The suggestion is that, if the courts find themselves
drawn into this kind of policy-making role, they will inevitably, in the
name of righting one wrong, create an even greater harm by subverting
the fundamental division of responsibility that underlies our constitutional structure.
I would argue that the courts are steering a fairly effective course,
given the basically ad hoc method by which this sort of judicial reform
takes place. Had the courts slavishly clung to old forms without considering the underlying structure and rationale of those forms, they
would have faced the danger of complete ineffectiveness. In one sense,
they have simply been forced, in a rather dramatic fashion, to face the
myth of what Abraham Chayes calls the "dramatic unities" of traditional litigation.6 7 In another sense, however, these cases have chal66. The constitutional problem has been alluded to. See note 53. The use of the Department of Justice seems to come closer to crossing this constitutional barrier than does the
use of judicial devices such as special masters.
67. Address by Abraham Chayes at the Yale Law School Legal Theory Workshop (Oct.
18, 1978).
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lenged the courts to fulfill their fundamental function-the redress of
actions, wrought by individuals or groups, which run counter to law or
custom. For the courts to have, in effect, thrown up their hands in these
cases by relying on the traditional, independent plaintiff and the traditions of the old ajudicatory structure, would have been to insure a de
facto bar to relief. That would have been an even more fundamental
blow to the court's legitimacy than was the change of forms. The seemingly mythical nature of the traditional model of adjudication supports
this analysis; the courts have often ignored formal barriers to expedite
performance of their more fundamental, one could even say constitutional, task-to do justice under law. To allow the forms of the litigation paradigm in this instance to bar the administration of justice
would be to allow the tail to wag the dog.
Once the courts recognized the fundamental defects in the traditional forms and began to change those forms--easing standing considerations, class actions and discovery rules, for example-the danger
loomed that the courts would lose the impartiality, independence and
narrow focus on redress of grievances under law which are the underpinnings of judicial legitimacy. The courts developed the special masters precisely to avoid the dangers inherent in involving the courts in
the reform of governmental institutions. In order for the courts to retain jurisdiction in these cases and remain effective and legitimate, they
had to develop an auxiliary in the form of the special master to function in the zone between judge and party.
Questions of legitimacy can only be answered by examining the
existing sources of legitimacy and by considering how those sources are
threatened or enhanced by innovation. Examining the Constitution in
a search for legitimacy in our system, however, only brings one back to
the fundamental elements which justify the exercise of judicial power
in a republican, constitutional structure, preeminently principles of adjudicatory competency and efficacy. These sources of legitimacy for
the courts are clearly enhanced by the use of special masters because of
its result-the effective achievement of justice for the injured parties.
One cannot doubt that a continued failure of the courts to render justice to individuals and groups who are harmed by acts contrary to the
substantive commands of the Constitution would subvert the fundamental roots of the courts' legitimacy in that constitutional scheme. All
other principles we point to as sources of legitimacy-independence,
impartiality, rule of law and others-really only function as the means
of serving and preserving that ultimate end.
Faced with this problem, the courts responded with a system
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which effectively protected the values underlying their legitimacy,
while also maintaining most of the protections of the liability stage
against excessive litigation and prejudiced verdicts present in the traditional adjudicatory structure. While the use of the Department of Justice seemingly collapsed this structure in the 1960s, the clear
prohibition against dejure segregation required the use of the Department primarily in the formulation of the remedial decree. It is interesting, moreover, that the courts have not substantially stepped into the
liability stage of these suits subsequently, even as the difficulties of
proving liability have increased. The reforms that have occurred in the
liability stage have centered around the entrance of the organizational
plaintiffs; little has been lost by such an approach and much gained in
effectiveness. Most important, at this sensitive stage of the litigation,
where the coercive power of the courts to force change in the status quo
of society is triggered, the courts have preserved the traditional paradigm, and thus the legitimacy of the system, by leaving the parties in
control of the litigation.6"
Once the threshold of liability has been passed, however, some
tampering with the triadic structure became more necessary and less
objectionable. The central elements of the traditional legal paradigm
were aimed at the avoidance of tyrannical coercion. Once there has
been a finding of liability in ajudication characterized by party independence and judicial restraint, and the courts' coercive power has
been triggered to correct the wrong, the question then becomes the
proper use of that power in the choice and implementation of a remedy. As the earlier discussion indicated, there is no more appealing or
more equitable remedy available than injunctions designed to reform
the processes of bureaucratic decision-making within the defendant institutions.6 9
The courts, then, must employ decrees that are clearly fraught with
dangers. The role of the special master, however, is designed to mitigate those dangers, while insuring effectiveness. The special masters
allow the courts to avoid being co-opted by having to take direct roles
in remedial formulation, while, at the same time, giving the courts the
independent voice needed to avoid reliance on bureaucrats who have a
stake in the status quo. The special master brings into the litigation the
consideration of the many affected interests which must be considered
to assure fairness without abandoning the focus on the remedy for a
68. For a negative view of the control exercised by the parties in school desegregation
cases, see Bell, supra note 34.
69. See.notes 28-32 and accompanying text supra.
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specific wrong. The special masters, in other words, by fusing aspects
of judge and advocate, serve two functions simultaneously: (1) the liberation from the limitations imposed upon school desegregation cases
by the traditional litigation paradigm; and (2) the preservation of the
traditional values of independence and dispassionate rationality which
bolster the courts' legitimacy in the constitutional division of powers as
surely as do the technical elements of the traditional paradigm. Many
people attack the special masters because they see only the collapse of
traditional litigation; they fail to perceive the legitimacy-protecting
function which the special masters also serve.
The new implementation actor appears to be following in these
same footsteps. Again the court is reaching into the bureaucratic
framework for accurate feedback. The courts, recognizing the unique
qualities of school desegregation litigation, are not prepared to use the
blunt instrument of contempt to force-feed policy changes. They are
more concerned, and properly so, with continuing to protect all of the
interests at stake and with protecting their own ability to respond independently to changing circumstances and knowledge.
By tapping directly into the bureaucracy, the court will be able to
learn more effectively and more fairly where challenged institutional
decisions begin. They will have an understanding of the subtleties that
shape the when, how, and why of bureaucratic decision-making and
activity. This approach will also enable the courts to tune more finely
the remedial order, and to tinker here and there with the details of the
remedy until the structural injunction is truly fair and effective. Finally, this approach will allow the courts to understand more fully the
limits on reform through injunction imposed by the nature of a bureaucracy's structure. These factors are difficult to translate into the confines of the litigation setting and it is certainly next to impossible for the
typical plaintiff or defendant to do so. The use of a new form of the
special master to perform this function enhances the courts' ability to
render fair, impartial and rational decisions, albeit in a continuing, and
not a discretely isolated, single-and, I would say, artificially structured-decision.
The danger still remains that the courts will be co-opted and become policy makers with less legitimacy than the elected representatives. The use of the special master, as it has developed over the last
fifteen years, contains no guarantees to the contrary. Its efficacy and its
preservation of legitimacy lies in the delicate balance of the relationship between the court and special master on the one hand, and the
special master and the affected interests on the other. One must remain
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concerned by the use of such an evolutionary structure in a system normally guided by precedent. For that reason, a public discussion of the
role of these masters, their relationship to the courts and the bounds
beyond which they will reduce, rather than protect, the legitimacy of
the courts would seem in order. No such discussion has yet appeared
in the literature, and the danger of ad hoc evolution remains clear.
Movement of the courts towards more involvement with the bureaucracy, towards direct meddling in public institutions, may erode their
sources of legitimacy. Legitimacy will only be preserved as long as
court personnel, like the special masters, are used as partial buffers
against the dangers of judges-as-bureaucrats, and are not used simply
to spur the courts' co-option into that role.
On the other side of the fence, a failure of the special masters to
consider and aggressively protect the wide range of interests affected by
this type of litigation, or to maintain the court mandate to provide for
effective desegregation, or to generate the kind of information flow necessary for the courts to render accurate and fair final judgments, would
undermine the overall legitimacy of this new adjudicatory structure.
The special master, no doubt, is not the perfect answer to the demands of this type of public-law litigation.70 There might be something to be said, for example, for the establishment by the courts of a
more permanent institution as a resource for use in desegregation litigation and similar cases involving the examination and reformation of
administrative organizations-something which is more of a cross between the ad hoc special master and the Department of Justice.7 '
Yet, despite its imperfections, this thread of evolutionary adaptation shows the judicial system working at its best, evolving new devices
from old forms in order to preserve the fundamental values and purposes of the adjudicatory process while dealing effectively with new
types of problems. The courts have molded an old device, the master,
to perform a new function, that of fusing judge and party, in a type of
case which the old structure was impotent to handle effectively and
fairly. In making this adaptation, the courts have solved problems
presented by this new litigation, by allowing for effective contributions
to the courts' final adjudications, as well as protecting the interests of
those who are touched by the courts' actions. The courts have not abdi70. There are clear indications that the usefulness of special masters may be limited in
some situations. Their ineffectiveness, however, suggests a need for greater innovation in
dispute resolution rather than a return to the equally inadequate traditional judicial forms.
See Note, "Mastering" Intervention in Prisons, 88 YALE L.J. 1062 (1979).
71. See Note, supra note 10.
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cated responsibility for dealing with this pressing legal issue, nor have
they trampled over fundamental legal values in pursuit of a just end.
They may have trampled on some myths along the way, but, in doing
so, the courts seem to have enhanced fundamental values rather than
undermined those values in the name of the myths. This evolution of
judicial forms, therefore, does not suggest the intrusion of the courts
into constitutionally forbidden activity. Rather, the evolution suggests
that the courts have moved to preserve the very elements central to the
constitutional notion of judicial power, but in a manner which avoids
abandonment of the mandate, also embodied in the Constitution, that
the people of the United States are entitled to the equal protection of
the law. Civil rights litigation has contributed much new life to the
American judicial system, and the use of special masters is but one example of the creative response of the courts to the challenge of this new
type of litigation.7 2

72. For a contrary evaluation of the increased judicial intervention in matters which
concern public policy formulation and the structure of public institutions, see D. HOROWITz,
THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 1-67, 255-98 (1977). For a thorough discussion of the
various issues faced by, and alternatives open to, a court in institutional reform litigation,
see Special Project, The Remedial Processin InstitutionalReform Litigation,78 COLUM. L.
REv. 784 (1978).

